Suing for sovereignty: property, territory, and the EU\u2019s Cyprus problem by Bryant, Rebecca & Hatay, Mete
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
ports 
b u t 
l i v e 
in a     Policy Brief 
KÜRESEL SİYASAL EĞİLİMLER MERKEZİ 
Suing for Sovereignty:  
Property, Territory, and the EU’s Cyprus Problem 
 
Rebecca Bryant (George Mason University) &  Mete Hatay (PRIO Cyprus Centre)  
Abstract: This article explores the actual and potential effects of recent European legal judg-
ments on ongoing reunification negotiations in Cyprus.  In particular, we argue that the European 
Union’s failure to formulate a policy regarding the position of Turkish Cypriots in Europe has had 
increasingly negative consequences both for negotiations between the island’s leaders and for rela-
tions between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.  The EU has chosen to ignore 
the suspension of constitutional order in the Republic of Cyprus, in the process refusing to acknowl-
edge the legal and political effects of the RoC’s EU entry on Turkish Cypriots.  We use a recent 
European Court of Justice judgment to illustrate the substantive effects of this hands-off approach, 
showing how the political use of transnational courts threatens to undermine what many have 
called the island’s “last chance” at reunification.  
  Less than ten days after recent elections in 
north Cyprus, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) announced a decision that may have     
serious effects for ongoing peace negotiations.  
Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections on 19 
April brought a conservative party back to 
power, and European commentators have begun 
to speculate about the new government’s        
potential to interfere in negotiations.  Cast as 
anti-solution, the new government is seen in 
some circles in Europe as a potential obstacle to 
the island’s reunification.  However, warnings 
about the impending disaster should                
negotiations fail only reveal the weakness of the 
EU’s position in Cyprus, where it has neglected 
to implement or even to formulate a consistent 
policy on the position of Turkish Cypriots within 
Europe. Turkish Cypriots now possess EU  pass-
ports but live in a state outside the EU acquis        
communautaire, and they are engaged in       
negotiations with a community that effectively 
controls the Republic of Cyprus, the state that 
represents Turkish Cypriots according to        
international law, even though they have no   
representation within it. Moreover, recent     
lawsuits over property reveal that Europe has 
been unable to formulate a position on the legal 
and political status of what are usually called 
“the areas not controlled by the government of 
Cyprus.”  Indeed, European diplomats admit 
that the union has taken a hands-off approach 
to the Cyprus Problem and that it has no backup 
plan should negotiations fail. 
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 This paper argues that recent election results in 
north Cyprus and the current indifference to 
negotiations throughout the island may be 
attributed to changes brought about by the EU’s 
bumbling entry into the Cyprus conflict.  
Although EU diplomats concede their mistake in 
admitting the RoC as a member state before the 
island’s reunification, the EU has made no 
substantive attempt since that time to correct its 
error or to rectify the dynamics set in motion by 
the RoC’s EU entry.  Instead, it appears that 
certain EU member states find the RoC’s          
presence in the union convenient for their own 
purposes, since the RoC is always prepared to 
wield its veto to block negotiations with Turkey.  
Equally importantly, the Cyprus Problem itself is 
a handy tool, since its non-resolution has become 
an additional stumbling-block on the road to 
Turkey’s EU entry. 
 
 In the current round of negotiations, the EU has 
taken a hands-off approach.  At the beginning of 
negotiations, Greek Cypriot president Dimitris 
Christofias called for a “Cypriot Solution,” a plan 
to be negotiated behind closed doors and without 
the mediation or interference of foreign bodies.  
This was to be a solution without a time-table 
and without pressure, and the EU consequently 
has tried to prevent the appearance of 
interference.  At the same time, however, 
Christofias has touted the “Cypriot Solution” as a 
“European solution,” a slogan that in the south 
has meant adherence to certain select rights and 
norms of the EU, as well as the capacity to use 
their EU member status to speak for the entirety 
of the island, including Turkish Cypriots, and to 
put pressure on Turkey.  A combination of closed
-door negotiation and pressure on EU 
representatives not to deal officially with Talat 
has meant that the leader whose voice only five 
years ago most represented Turkish Cypriot 
desires for a European future has become like a 
figure in a silent movie, in which he speaks and 
gestures without making an audible sound. 
 
 Moreover, the inability of Turkish Cypriots to 
gain a voice in international politics has 
continuously pushed the north into further 
reliance on Turkey, weakening Turkish Cypriots’ 
hands in any sort of negotiations.  Turkish 
Cypriots have become unrecognized pawns in 
legal and political games played by recognized 
powers.  And paradoxically, the 2003 opening of 
the checkpoints dividing the island only 
worsened this position, as Turkish Cypriots 
became increasingly squeezed into their 
unrecognized space.  Although the EU recognizes 
Turkish Cypriots as its citizens, all privileges of 
EU citizenship are funneled through the RoC, a 
government that does not have control over the 
area in which Turkish Cypriots live.  As a result, 
the RoC has been handed the opportunity to 
press Turkish Cypriots economically and 
politically both in the island and via ongoing EU 
negotiations with Turkey.  While slogans of 
“becoming tied to the world” and “masters in our 
own country” fired Turkish Cypriots to revolt in 
2002, it has now become increasingly clear that 
their links to the world will have to go through 
one of two gates: either the one guarded by 
Turkey, or that controlled by the Republic of 
Cyprus.  The question is, will the path beyond 
either of these gates lead Turkish Cypriots closer 
to Europe? 
 
One door or two? 
 
Since the division of the island in 1974, the 
unrecognized state that developed in Cyprus’ 
north has had a single door to the world. That 
door opens onto Turkey, and the door swings 
both ways: while Turkey has poured money, 
military might, and political clout into the island, 
Turkish Cypriots have gone to Turkey to study,  
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work, and live. Tourists entering Cyprus’ north 
must do so via Turkey’s ports, while Turkish 
Cypriots wishing to travel abroad often had to use 
Turkish passports, their own remaining 
unrecognized.  Turkish Cypriots were citizens of a 
state that technically did not exist, and as a result 
they had to funnel their hopes and dreams 
through a state that quickly began to treat 
Cyprus’ north as a de facto province.  Gradually, 
some Turkish Cypriots, and especially the youth, 
began to see Turkey, their single door onto the 
world, not as their protector but as the guardian 
of their prison. 
 
 What often goes unnoticed in current 
discussions of the Turkish Cypriot community, 
however, is that Turkish Cypriot isolation did not 
begin with the division of the island in 1974.  As 
with most aspects of the current impasse, Turkish 
Cypriot isolation may be traced to 1963, when the 
Republic of Cyprus, founded only three years 
earlier, began to break down.  In that year, 
President Makarios proposed fundamental 
changes to the constitution, including abolishing 
veto powers, changing the quotas of Turkish 
Cypriots employed in the civil service, and 
eliminating other communal rights.  Turkish 
Cypriots walked out of the parliament in protest, 
leading to the first post-independence period of 
intercommunal conflict.  During this period, 
approximately 25% of the Turkish Cypriot 
population fled their villages for armed enclaves, 
while others sandbagged Turkish neighborhoods 
and villages against the attack of Greek and 
Greek Cypriot paramilitary units.  Between 1963 
and 1974, almost 80% of Turkish Cypriots lived 
in militarized ghettoes, where they established 
their own state within a state, complete with their 
own administration and standing army.  In 
negotiations at the time, Turkish Cypriots argued 
that any solution to the impasse would have to 
include a zone of safety over which they had some 
form of communal control. 
 
 Importantly, the parliament was left without 
Turkish Cypriot representatives, and the 
remaining Greek Cypriot members of parliament 
passed acts impeding the Turkish members’ 
return.1  Moreover, in 1964 the Greek Cypriot 
leadership refused to allow UN peacekeeping 
troops to enter the island unless the UN received 
the permission of the Cyprus government, which 
at this point was controlled solely by Greek 
Cypriots.  While questions were raised about 
what the “Cyprus government” meant at this 
point, or how it was constituted, Turkish Cypriot 
protests that they should be consulted as partners 
in the republic were disregarded.  Although 
Britain gave assurances to Turkey and to Turkish 
Cypriots that “the government” in this instance 
meant the bi-communal government, the UN 
later ignored Vice-President Dr. Küçük’s 
attempts to use his veto power, thereby de facto 
accepting the Greek Cypriot-controlled 
government as the “Cyprus government.”  The 
effect of this was that the UN was able to protect 
Turkish Cypriots only by delegitimizing their 
political voice.   
 
1According to investigative journalist Makarios Droushiotis, in 
July 1965 “the Council of Ministers approved draft legislation 
extending the term of the President and House of Representatives 
for a year. It also approved a revision of the electoral law, 
abolishing the Turkish Cypriots’ right separately to elect the Vice 
President and the members of the House of Representatives from 
their community.”Moreover, when Turkish Cypriot 
parliamentarians requested protection to return to the Parliament to 
discuss the issue, then Speaker of the  House Glafcos Clerides 
“imposed such conditions on its acceptance as would be 
tantamount to an acceptance of minority status by the Turkish 
Cypriots.” Three years later, when the Turkish Cypriot community 
elected Dr. Fazıl Küçük as Vice-President and requested that he be 
allowed to take the oath of office along with the elected President, 
Archbishop Makarios, they were told that the election itself was 
illegal, as elections could be conducted only by the state, not by a 
community (Makarios Droushiotis, “Zurich-from curse to blessing 
in disguise,” Cyprus Mail, 1 October 2008).  
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Europe of north Cyprus’ products, such as textiles 
and citrus fruits, that bore the official stamp of 
the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus.  This was followed only two years later by 
a European Court of Human Rights decision in 
favor of the plaintiff in a case brought by a Greek 
Cypriot woman against Turkey for loss of use of 
her property in the north.  The effect of these two 
cases on Turkish Cypriots was immediate, as the 
textile sector cut more than five thousand jobs, 
while citrus producers began to let their orchards 
dry up.  Suddenly, the isolation that Turkish  
Cypriots had endured for so long appeared   
strangling, as even the houses in which they lived 
lost their legitimacy.   
 
 Although they had lived in a quasi-state for two 
decades, the fantastic nature of that existence 
came to the fore in the late 1990’s.  It was in this 
period that Turkish Cypriots sought other sources 
of income, developing “off-shore education” 
through semi-recognized universities and using 
the grey nature of their state to open casinos.  An 
attempt in the 1990’s to increase tourism from 
Europe failed because of lack of direct flights, and 
instead the casino-based tourist trade from Tur-
key boomed.  Their options restricted, Turkish 
Cypriots began further economic integration with 
Turkey during this period, including developing 
partnerships with Turkish businesses.  The tenu-
ousness of the economy also meant that they 
were especially hard hit by a banking crisis at the 
turn of the millennium, followed only a year later 
by an economic crash in Turkey.   
 
While Turkish Cypriots’ economic security was 
eroding, the RoC and its Greek Cypriot citizens 
had been promised EU entry.  Turkish Cypriots 
soon began pressuring their leaders to negotiate 
with Greek Cypriots for a reunification that 
would guarantee them the benefits of EU citizen-
ship.  Thousands of Turkish Cypriots flooded into 
Page 4 
 This move became the basis for the continuing 
recognition of a Greek Cypriot-controlled         
Republic of Cyprus as the island’s only            
government.  Following a Greek-sponsored coup 
and Turkish military intervention in 1974,   
Turkish Cypriots created a state in the island’s 
north that subsequently was recognized only by 
Turkey.  Approximately 142,000 Greek Cypriots 
originally from the north became refugees in the 
south, and many were settled in empty Turkish 
Cypriot houses or in refugee housing built on 
Turkish Cypriot land.  Around 55,000 Turkish 
Cypriots left their own homes in the south and 
fled to the north, where they settled in Greek 
Cypriot property.  The use of property belonging 
to members of the other community and which 
had been unwillingly abandoned during conflict 
laid the groundwork for what was to become the 
island’s contentious property issue. 
 
 For twenty years, Turkish Cypriots got by in 
their zone of safety, protected by the Turkish 
military and unnoticed by much of the world.  
Greek Cypriots continued their status as the sole 
recognized government in the island, despite 
their de facto suspension of the 1960               
constitution.  After 1974, their position as sole 
recognized authority gave them a voice in        
international forums that was denied to their 
Turkish Cypriot counterparts.  As a result, for-
eign aid and investment flowed into the south, 
while the north depended on the ever-fluctuating 
fortunes of Turkey.  Without direct flights to the 
north, the Turkish Cypriot economy relied for 
two    decades on a few wealthy tourists who   
appreciated its pristine isolation, and the export 
of a handful of products, but especially textiles 
and citrus. 
 
 In 1994, sleepy northern Cyprus began to wake 
up, when an ECJ judgment forbade the export to 
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the streets in late 2002 to call for an end to their 
leaders’ intransigence, demanding something 
that they labeled “peace” but which for many  
people signaled prosperity. 
 
In response to these widespread protests, the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership surprised everyone 
when in April 2003 it opened the checkpoints 
that divide the island, allowing free movement 
for the first time in 29 years.  This led to a period 
of high hopes and emotions, as Cypriots returned 
to visit homes and villages that they had not seen 
in almost three decades.  For many Greek       
Cypriots, it was a time of disappointment, as they 
returned to find that the villages they had         
remembered had irrevocably changed.  Turkish 
Cypriots also returned to their villages and often 
found them destroyed, in some cases inundated 
for dams or bulldozed for parking lots.  It was a 
period when the visceral realization of the pas-
sage of time forced many Cypriots to come to 
terms with a past that for some had remained  
unreconciled and even unexamined for almost 
thirty years.2 
 
For Turkish Cypriots, though, the opening also 
had another effect, which was that it finally 
opened a second door onto the world.  Suddenly, 
Turkish Cypriots flooded the supermarkets and 
shopping malls of the south, and several         
thousand found jobs there.  More than a hundred 
thousand Turkish Cypriots acquired identity 
cards from the RoC during this period, while an-
other fifty thousand acquired passports, allowing 
them to travel without impediment.  This gave 
them an unprecedented freedom, but they were 
soon to see that it was not without cost.  For only 
a year later, Greek Cypriots defeated a  reunifica-
tion plan at referendum  and joined the EU  
 
2This is a theme that Bryant explores in detail in her forthcoming 
The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus (Philadelphia: 
without their Turkish partners.  Greek Cypriots 
retained their status as recognized government of 
the entire island, and as a result they became a 
new gatekeeper for Turkish Cypriots wishing to 
do business, study, or travel.  Turkish Cypriots 
soon discovered that this second door provided 
them more options, but they were options that 
still required that they calculate the costs.  If the 
guardian of their prison in the north was Turkey, 
their guardian in the south soon became the 
Greek Cypriot government.   
 
Today, the RoC acts and decides on behalf of 
Turkish Cypriots in the EU while at the same   
time denying them the right to their own 
representation within the RoC or even within 
Europe.  Turkish Cypriots are allowed to possess 
passports of the RoC in order to travel as EU 
citizens, but the RoC denies passports to children 
of mixed marriages between Turkish Cypriots 
and citizens of Turkey.  The RoC has blocked EU 
attempts to develop direct trade to the north, 
while regulations aimed at increasing trade 
across the Green Line dividing the island have 
largely failed due to bureaucratic impediments, 
as well as social and political pressure put on 
those who would dare to trade.3 In a recent case, 
the owner of the only Turkish Cypriot company 
established in the south after the checkpoints’ 
opening reported that his success in selling 
potatoes to Europe through the RoC’s ports has 
led Greek Cypriot officials and political parties to 
put pressure both on him and his buyers.4As one 
farmer said to us when complaining about the 
regulations for trade, “If I go to Germany or 
somewhere, I present my passport, and they treat 
me as an EU citizen.  But they don’t treat me that 
way when I’m at home, here in the island.” 
 
3Mete Hatay, Fiona Mullen, and Julia Kalimeri, Intra-island trade 
in Cyprus: Obstacles, oppositions and psychological barriers, 
PRIO Cyprus Centre Paper 2/2008. 
4“Haçlı zihniyeti,” Kıbrıs Gazetesi, 17 May 2009.  
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Since the opening of the checkpoints, then,    
Turkish Cypriots have been increasingly squeezed 
between the two options available to them—
either reliance on a Turkey that many Turkish 
Cypriots have begun to view as a colonial power, 
or        reliance on Greek Cypriots who have occu-
pied the state that they once shared and who now 
dole out rights as though they were favors.  Un-
der such circumstances, it should not be surpris-
ing that Turkish Cypriots are increasingly skepti-
cal about the possibility of a negotiated solution 
and had become indifferent to the claims of the      
previous CTP government that they would solve 
the problems of north Cyprus through the               
reunification of the island under a federal system.  
In a Voice of America interview a day after the 
ECJ judgment was announced, the new Turkish    
Cypriot prime minister Derviş Eroğlu remarked 
that “[t]his is probably the last chance, Turkish 
Cypriots are starting to get fed up with this whole 
negotiating process, and they are losing their   
interest. People are more bothered about         
economic problems, their daily life. They don’t 
ask anymore about the talks. If we can’t use this 
last chance, Turkish Cypriots will start to think 
only about their own state.”5 
 
The problem of property 
 
Not long after the opening of the checkpoints, a 
Greek Cypriot by the name of Meletis Apostolides 
returned to visit his home in the northern town of 
Lapithos (in Turkish, Lapta) and found that a 
British couple had built a villa in what used to be 
his family’s orchard.  This was part of a              
development explosion in the north that began at 
the turn of the millennium, as a global property 
boom combined with hope for the island’s reuni-
fication.  This was a process that would accelerate    
 
5“Orams case could spell end of Cyprus talks,” Nathan Morley, Cy-
prus Mail, 1 May 2009.  
dramatically not long after the checkpoints’ 
opening.  In late 2003, Turkish Cypriots became 
aware of a clause in the UN reunification plan 
that would have allowed persons who 
“significantly improved” a property to pay 
compensation and keep it.  Many Turkish 
Cypriots “owned” Greek land that they had 
traded unilaterally for their own land in the 
south, whose titles they gave to their government 
for safe-keeping in the event of a solution.  Soon, 
Turkish Cypriots who had once exported citrus 
and olives resorted to selling the land on which 
they had once cultivated orchards.  Others simply 
saw it as an opportunity.  Riding on a wave of   
global property speculation, developers in the 
north soon cluttered the coastline with cheap 
villas and bungalow complexes.   
 
 This was to become one of the most rancorous 
issues dividing Greek and Turkish Cypriots after 
the 2003 opening of the checkpoints.  With the 
failure of the 2004 referendum, Apostolides 
decided to take the matter of his property into his 
own hands, instituting a lawsuit against the 
British couple, Linda and David Orams, in the 
courts of the south.  With the open checkpoints, 
he was even able to have a summons delivered to 
their door.  Although the Orams had bought the 
villa half-finished from a Turkish Cypriot, 
Apostolides has repeatedly emphasized that the 
suit is not intended to affect Turkish Cypriots but 
only foreigners who speculate on Greek Cypriot 
property.  He has also repeatedly said that in the 
event of a solution, he intends to return to 
Lapithos and so hopes that the lawsuit will 
impede further development. 
 
 But while Apostolides has emphasized in 
interviews that he voted in favor of the 
reunification plan and wants peace in the island, 
the property tangle that his lawsuit has further 
knotted may represent one of the greatest 
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impediments to achieving it. The judgment in the 
case in the RoC’s courts ordered that the Orams 
demolish the villa and pay Apostolides 
compensation.  When Apostolides was unable to 
enforce this judgment in the north, he used the 
RoC’s entry into the EU and sought to have the 
judgment enforced in the United Kingdom by 
seizing the couple’s properties there.  The case 
was remanded to the UK Court of Appeal, which 
subsequently asked the ECJ for clarification 
about the suspension of EU law (the acquis) in 
north Cyprus and about certain provisions of EU 
regulations.   
 
 The ECJ judgment is worth examination for 
what it says about the EU’s attempts to navigate 
the issue of Cyprus’ division.  While the court 
acknowledges that the house is located in areas 
not controlled by the government of the RoC, it 
notes that “the land is situated in the territory of 
the Republic of Cyprus and, therefore, the 
Cypriot court had jurisdiction to decide the case.”  
In other words, although the RoC government 
does not control the area, the area still falls 
within its territory and therefore within its 
domestic jurisdiction.  Moreover, the court notes 
that, “[a]ccording to national legislation, the real 
property rights relating to those areas of the 
Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of 
that Member State does not exercise effective 
control (‘the northern area’) subsist and remain 
valid in spite of the invasion of Cypriot territory 
in 1974 by the Turkish army and the ensuing 
military occupation of part of Cyprus.”6 As a 
result, the ECJ acknowledges the jurisdiction of 
courts in the south over property in the island’s 




6 h t t p : / / c u r i a . e u r o p a . e u / j u r i s p / c g i - b i n / f o rm . p l ?
lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=C-420/07  
 The lawyer handling the case for Apostolides 
noted in a press conference the day after the 
decision was announced that the view that 
Turkey had invaded the island and that the north 
is under military occupation had not been 
expressed before in any other decision, whether 
by the UN, the ECHR, or any other European 
institution.  He remarked that this judgment, 
then, carried important political significance.7  
And indeed, it is the recognition that the 
decisions of international law are ultimately 
based on history and politics that has made the 
judgment especially dismaying to Turkish 
Cypriots.  Because for most Turkish Cypriots, the 
Cyprus Problem is not only one of Turkish 
intervention and military presence, as both 
official Greek Cypriot rhetoric and now the ECJ 
claim.  Rather, it is one of dual occupation by 
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey of the island’s 
north, and occupation by Greek Cypriots of the 
state that all Cypriots were to have shared.  The 
suspension of constitutional order was not the 
result of 1974 but rather its prelude and 
foundation.  And it has been the failure of EU 
institutions explicitly to recognize this anomalous 
state of affairs that has led, in the end, to the 
island’s current impasse.   
 
 Since the judgment’s announcement, lawyers, 
academics, and media commentators in the south 
have stressed that the decision vindicates Greek 
Cypriot rights and reaffirms the justice of their 
cause. On both sides of the island, finger-pointing 
is rife, as Turkish Cypriots assert that lawsuits 
endanger ongoing negotiations, while Greek 
Cypriots claim that simply affirming their rights 
in a transnational court and opening the door to 
further lawsuits should not have such an 
 
 
7“Orams’a benzer yeni davalar yolda,” Aysu Basri Akter, Yenidüzen 
Gazetesi, 1 May 2009.  
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effect. In all such discussions in the south, the 
law is seen as an impartial body of rules, not as a 
set of regulations tied up with the history of 
private property and state-building in Europe.  In 
such discussions, there is the law, which should 
secure something known as “justice,” and then 
there is politics.  The fact that one’s idea of justice 
is inevitably tied up with politically contested 
histories is a point never discussed. 
 
 So, one commentator in Cyprus’ Sunday Mail 
asked, “Did Messrs Talat and Eroglu really expect 
the European Court of Justice to issue a political 
judgment, one that would suspend the rule of law 
in the name of realpolitik? Perhaps they did, 
much in the same way as Turkey often seems to 
see its harmonisation process with the European 
Union as a game of give and take where its 
strategic weight bears heavily on the scales, 
rather than as the wholesale adoption – without 
negotiation – of a body of Community law.”8  
This interesting failure to acknowledge that the 
process of EU accession is a thoroughly political 
one, and that certain areas of the harmonization 
process may be indefinitely suspended when 
particular interests are at stake, is especially 
ironic in Cyprus, where the suspension of 
constitutional order was not an impediment to 
the RoC’s accession. 
 
Of course, the case itself, as well as any decision 
that may be taken on it, is an instance neither of 
“justice” through law nor of realpolitik strictly 
speaking.  Rather, the case is one of the clearest 
instances of a phenomenon that has come to be 
known as “lawfare,” or the continuation of      
conflict by legal means.  This is a phenomenon 
that has emerged in a globalized era, when trans-
national courts may infringe on and even erode 
the sovereignty of nation-states in the name of  
 
8”Greek property rights must be recognized,” Cyprus Mail, 3 May 2009. 
human rights or international law.  In the case of 
sovereign nation-states recognized as such, this 
may have the effect of forcing those states to 
bring wanted criminals to justice, or to conform 
to human rights norms. Often, citizens of those 
very states may use transnational mechanisms to 
force the state to enforce human rights norms, as 
in cases against Russia and Turkey, or to come to 
terms with the crimes of the past, as in the cases 
of Chile and Argentina.  In such cases, citizens 
are able to employ the threat of international 
sanctions to improve their own lives in states 
where rule may be less than fully democratic. 
 
 The case of north Cyprus, however, is clearly 
different, for the TRNC is not a recognized state 
and therefore is not considered sovereign over its 
territory.  And the question of sovereignty brings 
us to the crux of the issue, since sovereignty itself 
is about control over territory, enshrined in 
international law through the recognition of 
borders that a state has the right to control.  
Northern Cyprus is now depicted on maps as “the 
area not controlled by the government of 
Cyprus,” simultaneously implying that the 
ceasefire line dividing the island is not recognized 
as a border, and that the RoC may have de jure 
but does not have de facto sovereignty over the 
north.  What the recent judgment affirms is that 
the recognition of RoC sovereignty over the 
entirety of the island means that RoC courts have 
the capacity to rule on matters in the north, even 
if the RoC is unable to enforce those judgments.  
This is, one might say, the difference between the 
rule of law and the force of law.   
 The importance of the Orams case, then, is that 
unlike cases involving recognized states, this case 
is not simply one in which international laws and 
norms may restrict or constrain the rights of the 
sovereign.  Rather, it presents a challenge to the       
Turkish Cypriot administration’s de facto 
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sovereignty in the north, in that it uses individual 
means to challenge that state’s claims to control 
its territory.  Individuals who buy property under 
north Cyprus’ laws risk being arrested or having 
their property abroad confiscated.  As with states 
that harbor wanted criminals, the legal 
implication of this judgment is that the laws 
regulating property in the north are themselves 
illegal.  In this case, then, the challenge presented 
to Turkish Cypriot leaders is that the judgment 
does not simply erode claims to sovereignty that 
many Turkish Cypriots have already begun to see 
as empty.  Rather, the danger is that it attempts 
to impose the laws of the RoC on the north even 
as the scope of a future state that would 
encompass all of Cyprus is being negotiated. 
 
 To be more specific, negotiations over property 
have heretofore recognized that Greek Cypriots 
are owners of land in the north, just as they have 
recognized Turkish Cypriot ownership in the 
south. However, ownership rights, and 
specifically the right to occupy and use one’s 
property, are gained through a property regime.  
That property regime is established through the 
recognition of territory, and of a state’s right to 
establish a property regime within its territory.  
This may mean, for instance, that a state may 
confiscate property when it is for the public 
benefit.  This has happened frequently in the 
south, where thousands of acres of Turkish 
Cypriot land have been expropriated to build 
refugee housing, dams, parking lots, and even an 
international airport. Greek Cypriot leaders often 
comment that this is to be expected, and that 
every government may do this, failing to address 
the fact that much of the land expropriated in the 
south since 1974 has been Turkish Cypriot.   
 
 Where discussions have foundered, then, is on 
how to negotiate the gap between ownership and 
right. Turkish Cypriot negotiators have argued 
that if individual property rights may be 
sacrificed for the public benefit, and if Greek 
Cypriots have accepted this as a principle through 
expropriation of Turkish Cypriot property, then 
there is surely no greater public benefit than 
peace.  In other words, they have argued that in 
negotiating a new property regime, not everyone 
will be able to exercise their ownership rights, 
and that this will be for the public good, in that it 
will be fundamental to establishing the 
bicommunal, bizonal, federal system upon which 
all have, in principle, agreed.  Negotiations, then, 
should lead to the establishment of a property 
regime that would recognize the ownership of all 
Cypriots while determining the parameters of 
their rights to use their property.  In some cases—
as with Turkish Cypriot properties in the south—
that would presumably mean that some Greek 
Cypriot owners will have to accept compensation 
in the name of the public good.  What has been 
upsetting for Turkish Cypriot leaders about the 
Orams case is that, even as negotiations continue 
aimed at establishing such a property regime, this 
case aims to impose a property regime: namely, a 
property regime based solely on the RoC’s status 
as the recognized government of the island.  
What the decision of the European court 
ultimately represents, then, is the legal equivalent 
of military victory. 
 
 Under these circumstances, further polarization 
seems on the horizon. Indeed, the last five years 
have witnessed distrust growing on both sides of 
the island. In the north, that has taken the 
further form of a growing distrust of Europe, 
which has taken no steps to solve the legal and 
political tangles that the RoC’s entry has created 
for Cyprus’ north.  The recent election in the 
north is one sign of this polarization, which has 
taken the form not of a revived Turkish 
nationalism, but of a growing Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism.  Feeling the threat of being crushed 
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by Greek Cypriot legal and political hegemony or 
swamped by potential Turkish investment and 
immigration, Turkish Cypriots have turned 
inward.  This inwardness has taken many forms, 
including extreme self-criticism, but one of its 
symptoms is a return to a populist party that 
many see as less likely to surrender everything in 
the name of a “peace” that has become 
increasingly abstract and elusive. 
 
Whither a “Cypriot solution”? 
 
 For almost four years after the referendum, 
former Greek Cypriot president Tassos 
Papadopoulos refused to negotiate with his 
Turkish Cypriot counterpart, instead preferring 
to use the stick of the EU veto against a Turkey 
trying to get in the door.  He was the first to 
promise Greek Cypriots a “European solution” 
through the abandonment of the Annan Plan, a 
promise that his successor Christofias has sworn 
to keep.  One of the primary sticking points in the 
plan was its property regime, which 
Papadopoulos characterized as “unjust” and     
“un-European” in that it did not ensure the 
universal return of all Greek Cypriots to their 
homes.  What has become increasingly clear is 
that the federalism to which Greek Cypriot 
leaders have paid lip service for so long remains 
vague in their minds, in that it is impossible to 
reconcile such positions on property with the 
future establishment of a bicommunal, bizonal, 
federal state to which they have in principle 
agreed. 
 
 Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, had gone a 
long way towards overcoming their leaders’ past 
intransigence in their acceptance of the Annan 
Plan, though the subsequent years of increased 
polarization have eroded much of their previous 
hope. After all, for more than two decades the 
old,  nationalist leaders of the Turkish Cypriot  
community had tried to convince them that the 
property problem in Cyprus would be solved by a 
global exchange: Turkish Cypriots who had left 
behind property in the south would give it up for 
Greek Cypriot property in the north, and vice 
versa.  The 1996 ECHR decision against Turkey 
showed that this would not be possible, and by 
the time of the checkpoints’ opening in 2003, 
Turkish Cypriots had already accepted that any 
future property regime would have to allow 
certain numbers of Greek Cypriots to repossess 
and return to their property.  The Annan Plan 
took this into account, creating a complicated 
compromise that would ensure the return of the 
majority of Greek Cypriots to their homes in the 
north while maintaining that area as a Turkish-
majority constituent state. 
 
 A “Cypriot solution” has meant scratching this 
carefully crafted compromise and returning to 
maximalist positions, especially in the case of 
Greek Cypriot negotiators, who insist that all 
Greek Cypriot owners must at least have the right 
to choose what to do with their properties.  While 
this might be an ideal solution, it does not 
realistically take into account the compromises 
necessary to construct a federal system.  What 
the Orams case shows, however, is that one 
doesn’t always need to be realistic to get one’s 
way.  Although the case was initiated against a 
non-Cypriot, it presents the possibility of Greek 
Cypriots individually using the courts to sue any 
current occupant of their property in the north, 
and of having that judgment enforced in Europe 
in the case of those with investments or business 
there. And this, perhaps, is the truly “European 
solution,” in which Cypriots may fight the last of 
their battles in courts of law. Whether it is also a 
“Cypriot solution” may depend on whether its 
result resembles anything like peace. 
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